In Bangladesh, pre-trial and undertrial detention has turned out to be a big constitutional and human rights issue, not necessarily because it is statutorily designed but because of chronic judicial procrastination in the criminal justice system. Even though pre-trial detention is supposed to be an extraordinary measure to guarantee the integrity of the trial and prevent the risk of procedural abuses, in reality, it often leads to extended denial of freedom, without a speedy trial. This paper critically looks at how institutional slowness in courts and investigations, such as late filing of charge sheets, adjournment patterns, and institutional backlog, are all involved in normalising the extended incarceration. The study is founded on constitutional values of personal liberty pursuant to Articles 32 and 33 of the Constitution of Bangladesh and points to the fact that there is a gap between the formal legal protection and its practical application. It claims that judicial delay is the key structural element that makes pre-trial detention an approximate form of punishment. The paper also examines pertinent Bangladeshi jurisprudence, such as Aruna Sen v. Government of Bangladesh and Abdul Latif Mirza v. Government of Bangladesh, to illuminate the judicial doctrinal devotion to liberty, as well as to point out enforcement restrictions in practice. An Indian constitutional jurisprudence case-specifically, the case of Arnab Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI-in the comparative analysis can be seen as reflecting a developing judicial awareness that delay in itself can be a form of infringement of personal liberty. The paper concludes that procedural discipline, filing of charge sheets in a timely manner, legal assistance, better institutional co-ordination and a system of bail which considers delay as a constitutionally relevant aspect of the case are all that is needed to bring meaningful reform in Bangladesh. Finally, the paper stresses that criminal justice legitimacy will be evaluated based on how much the custodial power is restrained in response to delayed adjudication rather than the scope of the custodial power.