The ideas of "good" and "right" have occupied a central place in moral philosophy for centuries, yet their relationship continues to invite debate in contemporary ethical discourse. Although these concepts are often discussed together, they reflect different dimensions of moral judgment and, at times, appear to pull ethical reasoning in different directions. This article revisits their philosophical foundations and examines how they continue to shape moral decision-making, legal thought, public policy, and human rights in the modern world. Drawing on classical ethical traditions, including virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism, alongside contemporary scholarship in applied ethics, the study offers a comparative conceptual analysis of the two values. The discussion suggests that the good is primarily concerned with human flourishing and desirable outcomes, whereas the right emphasises duties, justice, and moral obligations. Even so, the distinction is less rigid than it first appears. A close examination of philosophical and applied ethical literature indicates that durable moral judgments rarely emerge from privileging one over the other. Rather, ethical practice is strengthened when concern for beneficial outcomes is guided by principled action. The article, therefore, argues that the good and the right should be understood as complementary, not competing, dimensions of human morality. Recognising their interdependence provides a more coherent ethical framework for addressing contemporary challenges in governance, technology, law, and sustainable development while safeguarding human dignity and social justice.