Interdisciplinary research (IDR) is increasingly the default mode for addressing complex socio-technical problems, yet “integration” remains difficult because disciplines differ in epistemic norms, methods, and validation standards. Concurrently, research technologies, data infrastructures, workflow systems, modelling platforms, and AI-enabled tools are reshaping how integration occurs by mediating translation, standardisation, and coordination across disciplinary boundaries. Aviation cybersecurity provides a high-stakes exemplar: it is inherently interdisciplinary (safety engineering, avionics, human factors, software assurance, cryptography, governance) and constrained by stringent airworthiness and regulatory regimes (EASA, 2023; ICAO, 2021). Understanding the mechanisms by which science-and-technology integration enables (or distorts) interdisciplinary outcomes is therefore central to both knowledge production and safety-critical system stewardship.

Following PRISMA 2020 for systematic review reporting (Page et al., 2021) and PRISMA-S for search transparency (Rethlefsen et al., 2021), we conducted a structured search and thematic synthesis of peer-reviewed scholarship and authoritative standards/reports on interdisciplinary integration mechanisms and enabling research technologies. We used mixed-evidence appraisal guidance (e.g., MMAT) where applicable (Hong et al., 2018). Aviation cybersecurity literature and governance documents were included as a domain-specific lens, emphasizing airworthiness security process standards and sector-level cyber strategy and incident governance (EASA, 2023; ICAO, 2021; RTCA, n.d.; EUROCAE, 2014).

Evidence converges on five integration layers epistemic, methodological, infrastructure/data, socio-organizational, and governance and shows that technology functions as boundary infrastructure that actively shapes integrative possibilities (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Wilkinson et al., 2016). In aviation cybersecurity, integration is operationalized through lifecycle security processes and compliance structures (e.g., ED-202A/DO-326A family referenced by EASA guidance), alongside sector-level coordination pillars such as information sharing, incident management, and capacity building (EASA, 2023; ICAO, 2021). Reviews of aviation cyber threats highlight expanding attack surfaces across aircraft systems, aeronautical communications, ATM/airport ecosystems, and supply chains, amplifying the need for interdisciplinary integration that is measurable and governable (EUROCONTROL, 2021; Mäurer, 2022; Ukwandu et al., 2022). We propose an integrative framework positioning science-and-technology integration as a coupled socio-technical process where platforms, standards, and workflows are not merely supportive tooling but constitutive elements of interdisciplinary knowledge integration. For safety-critical domains like aviation, integration must be treated as auditable lifecycle work with explicit governance, not an informal collaboration outcome.