I J C R M

International Journal of Contemporary Research In Multidisciplinary

Research Article

Secure API Design and Authentication Strategies for Distributed Microservices Systems

Sravika Koukuntla *
Senior Research Associate and Technology Lead, Vanguard Richardson, TX, 19087

Corresponding Author: * Sravika Koukuntla

DOI: https:/doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18464699

Abstract

The rapid adoption of cloud-native applications has led to the widespread use of microservices architecture, where complex systems are decomposed into independently deployable services that communicate primarily through application programming interfaces (APIs). While this architectural paradigm improves scalability, flexibility, and development agility, it also significantly expands the system's attack surface, making API security a critical challenge in distributed environments. In particular, issues related to authentication, authorisation, service-to-service trust, and API abuse become more complex as security controls are decentralised across multiple services and networks. This project investigates the design and implementation of secure API and authentication strategies tailored for distributed microservice systems. A security-by-design methodology was adopted, integrating protection mechanisms at multiple architectural layers, including an API gateway, identity and access management service, and individual microservices. Token-based authentication using OAuth 2.0 and JSON Web Tokens (JWT) was implemented to enable stateless, scalable identity verification, while fine-grained role- and scope-based authorisation was used to enforce the principle of least privilege. Additionally, a zero-trust communication model was applied to internal service interactions, ensuring that all requests—whether external or internal—were explicitly authenticated and authorised. The proposed architecture was evaluated under realistic medium-scale workloads over an extended testing period, simulating both normal operational traffic and adversarial scenarios such as token misuse, replay attacks, unauthorised access attempts, and request flooding. Quantitative results demonstrate that the system achieved high authentication accuracy, effectively blocking the vast majority of unauthorised requests while maintaining acceptable latency under peak load conditions. Authorisation mechanisms successfully prevented privilege escalation and lateral movement between services, even when internal service identities were assumed to be compromised. The API gateway played a pivotal role in reducing backend exposure to malicious traffic, and rate-limiting controls ensured service availability during high-volume request bursts. Overall, the findings confirm that secure API design, when combined with robust authentication, fine-grained authorisation, and zero-trust principles, can significantly enhance the security and resilience of distributed microservices systems without imposing prohibitive performance overhead. This study provides a practical, validated framework that can guide the development of secure microservices-based applications in real-world cloud environments.

Manuscript Information

- **ISSN No:** 2583-7397
- **Received:** 06-08-2024
- **Accepted:** 28-09-2024
- **Published:** 30-10-2024
- **IJCRM:**3(5); 2024: 274-282

- **Plagiarism Checked:** Yes
- **Peer Review Process:** Yes

How to Cite this Manuscript

Koukuntla S. Secure API Design and Authentication Strategies for Distributed Microservices Systems. International Journal of Contemporary Research in Multidisciplinary.2024; 3(5):274-282.

KEYWORDS: Electronics Engineering, Telecommunication Systems, Signal Processing, Communication Technologies, Embedded Systems.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid evolution of cloud-native applications has led to the widespread adoption of Microservices Architecture, a paradigm that decomposes large monolithic systems into independently deployable, loosely coupled services. Each microservice exposes functionality through well-defined APIs, enabling scalability, resilience, and faster development cycles. However, this architectural shift significantly expands the attack surface, making API security a critical concern in modern distributed systems. In microservices-based environments, APIs serve as the primary communication channel between services as well as between external clients and backend systems. Unlike traditional monolithic applications—where security controls are centralised—distributed microservices require security to be enforced consistently across multiple services, networks, and deployment environments. This decentralisation introduces complex challenges related to authentication, authorisation, identity propagation, and secure service-to-service communication. One of the most prominent risks in distributed systems is unauthorised access to APIs, which can lead to data breaches, privilege escalation, and service disruption. Threats such as token theft, replay attacks, insecure endpoints, and misconfigured access controls are amplified in microservices ecosystems due to the large number of exposed endpoints. Consequently, secure API design must be embedded into the system from the earliest stages of architecture planning rather than being treated as an afterthought.

Authentication plays a foundational role in securing APIs by verifying the identity of users, applications, or services attempting to access resources. Modern microservices increasingly rely on token-based and federated authentication mechanisms, such as OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, and JSON Web Token. These approaches enable stateless authentication, scalability, and interoperability across heterogeneous services, which are essential characteristics of distributed architectures.

Beyond authentication, secure API design encompasses principles such as least privilege, defence in depth, secure defaults, and explicit trust boundaries. Components like API Gateway act as security enforcement points, handling concerns such as request validation, rate limiting, authentication offloading, and traffic monitoring. Internally, microservices often adopt zero-trust communication models, where every service request must be authenticated and authorised regardless of its origin. This project focuses on designing secure APIs and implementing robust authentication strategies tailored for distributed microservices systems. It explores architectural patterns, authentication workflows, token management practices, and service-to-service security mechanisms that collectively enhance system resilience against evolving cyber threats. By aligning security controls with microservices principles, organisations can achieve both agility and strong protection for their digital assets.

2. System Architecture and Threat Model

In a distributed microservices system, security architecture must be deliberately designed to protect APIs that operate across multiple trust boundaries. Unlike monolithic applications—where internal calls are implicitly trusted—microservices communicate over networks that are often shared, dynamic, and exposed to internal as well as external threats. Therefore, the system architecture itself becomes a critical security control layer.

A typical secure microservices architecture is organised around a centralised API Gateway, which acts as the single external entry point for client requests. The API gateway performs preliminary security enforcement, including request validation, authentication, rate limiting, and traffic filtering. This design reduces direct exposure of backend services and ensures consistent policy enforcement across all APIs.

Behind the gateway, individual microservices are deployed as independent units, each owning its data and business logic. Communication between services occurs over lightweight protocols such as HTTP/REST or gRPC, often within containerised environments orchestrated by platforms like Kubernetes. While orchestration platforms provide network isolation and service discovery, they do not inherently guarantee secure communication, making application-level security essential.

From a trust perspective, modern architectures increasingly adopt a Zero Trust Architecture model. In this approach, no request—whether originating from an external client or an internal service—is trusted by default. Every interaction must be authenticated, authorised, and validated. This principle is particularly important in microservice systems, where lateral movement by attackers can otherwise occur once a single service is compromised.

Threat Model Overview

Designing secure APIs requires a clear understanding of potential threats that target distributed microservices environments. One major threat is unauthorised access, where attackers exploit weak authentication or leaked credentials to invoke APIs. Token theft, insecure storage of secrets, and lack of token expiration can all lead to prolonged unauthorised access across multiple services.

Another critical risk is API abuse and denial-of-service attacks. Since microservices expose numerous endpoints, attackers may attempt request flooding, brute-force authentication attempts, or parameter manipulation to exhaust system resources. Without proper rate limiting and request validation at the gateway level, such attacks can cascade and disrupt dependent services.

Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks pose an additional threat, particularly in service-to-service communication. If internal traffic is not encrypted or authenticated, attackers who gain network access can intercept or modify API requests. This risk underscores the importance of mutual authentication and encrypted communication channels between microservices.

Privilege escalation is another common concern in distributed systems. Improperly designed authorisation logic or overly permissive service roles may allow a compromised service to access resources beyond its intended scope. This violates the principle of least privilege and can result in widespread data exposure. Finally, misconfiguration and inconsistent security policies remain a significant source of vulnerabilities. In microservice systems, security controls are distributed across multiple components. Any inconsistency—such as missing authentication on a single endpoint—can become an entry point for attackers.

By aligning system architecture with a well-defined threat model, secure API design can proactively mitigate these risks. The combination of API gateways, zero-trust principles, encrypted communication, and strict authentication policies forms the foundation for resilient distributed microservices systems.

3. Secure API Design Principles for Distributed Microservices

Secure API design forms the backbone of resilient distributed microservices systems. Since APIs act as the primary interface between services and external clients, their design directly influences the system's exposure to security threats. In microservices environments, where services are independently developed and deployed, consistent and well-defined security principles are essential to prevent vulnerabilities from propagating across the ecosystem. A fundamental principle of secure API design is explicit trust boundaries. Every API must clearly define who is allowed to access it and under what conditions. In distributed systems, assuming that internal traffic is inherently safe is a critical mistake. APIs should be designed with the assumption that all requests—whether originating externally or internally—may be hostile. This mindset ensures that authentication and authorisation checks are enforced uniformly across all service endpoints.

Another key principle is least privilege access. APIs should expose only the minimum set of operations required for a client or service to perform its function. Overly broad endpoints or generic access tokens increase the risk of misuse if credentials are compromised. By designing fine-grained APIs with scoped permissions, organisations can limit the blast radius of security incidents and prevent unauthorised actions even when access is partially breached.

Statelessness is also central to secure API design in microservices. Stateless APIs do not store session information on the server, relying instead on tokens or credentials provided with each request. This approach not only improves scalability but also reduces attack vectors related to session hijacking and server-side state manipulation. Proper token validation and expiration policies ensure that stateless authentication remains secure without sacrificing performance.

Input validation and strict schema enforcement represent another critical design aspect. APIs must treat all incoming data as untrusted and validate it rigorously before processing. Poor validation can lead to injection attacks, malformed requests, or logic exploitation. Designing APIs with well-defined request and response schemas, along with consistent error handling, helps prevent information leakage and unintended behaviour.

Versioning and backward compatibility play an indirect yet important role in security. As APIs evolve, older versions may contain deprecated or weaker security mechanisms. Explicit versioning allows teams to phase out insecure endpoints while maintaining controlled transitions for clients. Secure API design ensures that obsolete versions are eventually retired and do not remain as hidden attack surfaces. Finally, security by default should be embedded into the API lifecycle. Secure defaults—such as mandatory authentication, encrypted communication, and restricted access—reduce the likelihood of misconfiguration. Developers should be required to explicitly relax security controls only when necessary, rather than adding them retroactively. This approach aligns API development with defence-in-depth strategies and promotes consistent security practices across all microservices.

By adhering to these secure API design principles, distributed microservices systems can achieve a balance between flexibility and protection. Well-designed APIs not only support scalability and interoperability but also serve as a robust first line of defence against modern cyber threats.

4. METHODOLOGY

This project adopted a systematic, design-oriented methodology to develop and evaluate secure API design and authentication strategies for distributed microservices systems. The methodology was structured to reflect real-world industry practices while maintaining architectural rigour and security best practices. The overall approach combined architectural design, threat-driven security modelling, controlled implementation, and validation through simulated attack scenarios.

4.1 Project Design Approach

The methodology followed a security-by-design approach, where security considerations were integrated at every stage of the system lifecycle rather than being applied post-deployment. The project was executed in four major phases: (1) architectural design of a distributed microservices system, (2) threat modelling and risk identification, (3) implementation of secure API and authentication mechanisms, and
(4) evaluation and validation of security controls.

A modular microservices-based application was conceptualised to simulate a real-world distributed environment. The system was intentionally designed to expose multiple APIs with both external client access and internal service-to-service communication, allowing comprehensive evaluation of authentication, authorisation, and API security controls.

4.2 Microservices Architecture Design

The system architecture was designed using a cloud-native microservices model, where each service represented a distinct business capability and operated independently. Services were designed to be stateless, loosely coupled, and independently deployable. Each microservice exposed RESTful APIs with clearly defined contracts and ownership boundaries.

A centralised API Gateway was positioned as the single-entry point for all external client requests. The gateway acted as a policy enforcement layer, responsible for handling authentication delegation, request validation, rate limiting, and traffic routing. This architectural choice ensured that backend services were not directly exposed to untrusted clients, significantly reducing the external attack surface.

Internal communication between microservices was designed to occur over secure HTTP or gRPC channels. Each service

validated incoming requests independently, ensuring that internal calls were not implicitly trusted. This design aligned with zero-trust principles and prevented lateral movement in the event of a service compromise.

4.3 Threat Modelling and Security Requirements Analysis

Before implementation, a structured threat modelling exercise was conducted to identify potential security risks specific to distributed microservices environments. Common threat vectors such as unauthorised API access, token replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, excessive privilege escalation, and denial-of-service attacks were systematically analysed.

Based on the identified threats, explicit security requirements were defined. These included mandatory authentication for all APIs, fine-grained authorisation controls, secure token handling, encrypted communication channels, and strict validation of all incoming requests. This threat-driven approach ensured that security mechanisms were aligned directly with realistic attack scenarios rather than theoretical assumptions.

4.4 Authentication Strategy Implementation

Authentication was implemented using token-based, stateless authentication mechanisms to support scalability and distributed deployment. OAuth 2.0 was selected as the primary authorisation framework, with OpenID Connect layered on top for identity verification. JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) were used to represent authenticated identities and access claims.

An external Identity and Access Management (IAM) component was integrated to issue and manage tokens. Upon successful authentication, clients received short-lived access tokens containing scoped permissions and identity claims. These tokens were validated at the API gateway and again at the microservice level to prevent token misuse or replay.

For service-to-service authentication, mutual trust was established through token-based validation rather than relying solely on network-level security. Each microservice was assigned a unique service identity, and inter-service tokens were issued with narrowly scoped permissions, enforcing least privilege access across internal communications.

4.5 Authorisation and Access Control Design

Authorisation logic was designed using a fine-grained, role- and scope-based access control model. Rather than granting broad access rights, APIs were protected using specific scopes that mapped directly to individual operations or resources. This ensured that services and clients could only perform actions explicitly permitted by their tokens.

Authorisation checks were implemented at multiple layers. The API gateway performed coarse-grained authorisation by validating token scopes before forwarding requests. Backend microservices enforced fine-grained authorisation rules based on business logic and resource ownership. This layered authorisation approach provided defence in depth and reduced reliance on a single control point.

4.6 Secure API Design and Validation Controls

All APIs were designed following secure API design principles. Each endpoint enforced strict input validation using predefined request schemas. Unexpected parameters, malformed payloads, and invalid data types were rejected early in the request lifecycle to prevent injection attacks and logic exploitation.

Consistent error-handling mechanisms were implemented to avoid information leakage. APIs returned standardised error responses without exposing internal system details, stack traces, or configuration information. Versioning strategies were applied to APIs to ensure backward compatibility while allowing insecure or deprecated endpoints to be phased out systematically.

4.7 Secure Communication and Zero Trust Enforcement

To protect data in transit, all external and internal API communications were encrypted using TLS. Service-to-service communication adopted a zero-trust communication model, where every request required authentication and authorisation regardless of network location.

No service implicitly trusted another service based on the deployment context. Even internally generated requests were required to present valid credentials and comply with defined access policies. This approach ensured resilience against internal breaches and misconfigurations.

4.8 Monitoring, Rate Limiting, and Abuse Prevention

Security monitoring was incorporated to detect abnormal API behaviour. The API gateway enforced rate limiting to mitigate denial-of-service and brute-force attacks. Request metrics, authentication failures, and access patterns were logged for analysis and anomaly detection.

Basic abuse prevention mechanisms were implemented by restricting excessive requests, rejecting malformed payloads, and enforcing strict request size limits. These controls prevented cascading failures across dependent services during attack scenarios.

4.9 Evaluation and Validation

The effectiveness of the implemented security mechanisms was evaluated through controlled testing scenarios. Simulated attacks, including unauthorised token usage, expired token replay, excessive request flooding, and unauthorised service calls, were conducted to validate the robustness of authentication and authorisation controls.

The system's response to these scenarios was analysed to ensure that security violations were detected and blocked without impacting legitimate traffic. The evaluation confirmed that layered security controls, combined with secure API design and zero-trust enforcement, significantly reduced the system's vulnerability to common distributed system attacks.

5. Results and Security Evaluation

This section presents the results obtained from the implementation and evaluation of secure API design and authentication strategies in a distributed microservices system. The evaluation was carried out under realistic medium-scale

workloads, representative of an enterprise pilot or institutional deployment. Quantitative metrics, comparative analysis, and visual figures are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed security architecture.

5.1 Experimental Environment and Traffic Profile

The system was evaluated continuously for 14 days to capture normal usage patterns, peak loads, and abnormal traffic behaviour.

Deployment Overview

- API Gateway: 1 (policy enforcement enabled)
- Microservices: 8 independently deployed services
- Identity & Authentication Server: 1 primary, 1 standby
- Total API endpoints: 72
- Average daily requests: 18,000–25,000
- Peak traffic observed: ~1,200 requests/sec

Traffic Distribution

- Legitimate client requests: 75%
- Internal service-to-service requests: 17%
- Invalid or malicious requests: 8%

5.2 Authentication Effectiveness

Authentication effectiveness was evaluated using OAuth 2.0 with JWT-based stateless authentication. Requests with valid, expired, tampered, replayed, and missing tokens were analysed.

Table 5.1 Authentication Outcomes

Authentication Scenario	Requests Tested	Allowed	Blocked	Accuracy (%)
Valid Tokens	24,600	24,410	190	99.23
Expired Tokens	8,200	0	8,200	100
Tampered Token Signatures	4,150	0	4,150	100
Replay Attempts	3,600	48	3,552	98.67
Missing Tokens	2,900	0	2,900	100

The authentication layer consistently rejected unauthorised requests while maintaining high acceptance accuracy for valid tokens. Minor replay leakage occurred only under burst traffic conditions, remaining below 2%.



Figure 5.1 illustrates the number of allowed and blocked requests across different authentication scenarios, highlighting strong rejection rates for invalid tokens.

5.3 Authentication Latency Analysis

Authentication latency was measured to evaluate performance overhead under increasing request volumes.

Table 5.2 Authentication Latency Metrics

Load Level (req/sec)	Average Latency (ms)	95th Percentile (ms)
200	31	49
500	44	68
800	61	92
1,200	79	118

The latency increase was gradual and predictable, remaining within acceptable response time limits for interactive APIs.

Figure 5.2 shows the relationship between request rate and authentication latency, indicating scalable behaviour under load.



5.4 Authorisation Accuracy and Least Privilege Enforcement

Authorisation controls were evaluated using role-based and scope-based access restrictions.

Table 5.3 Authorisation Validation Results

Authorization Scenario	Requests	Authorized	Denied	Accuracy (%)
Correct Role & Scope	15,300	15,140	160	98.95
Correct Role, Wrong Scope	7,100	0	7,100	100
Incorrect Role	5,400	0	5,400	100
Service Identity Misuse	3,200	26	3,174	99.19

Fine-grained scopes ensured strict least-privilege enforcement, preventing role escalation and unauthorised cross-service access.

Figure 5.3 depicts the proportion of authorised versus denied requests, emphasising effective access control enforcement.



5.5 API Gateway Security Impact

The API Gateway's role was evaluated by comparing system behaviour with gateway security enabled and disabled.

Table 5.4 Gateway Impact Analysis

Metric	Without Gateway	With Gateway
Unauthorised Requests Reaching Services	34%	4%
Malformed Requests Blocked	29%	97%
Average End-to-End Latency (ms)	86	104
Backend Error Rate	5.2%	1.6%

The gateway reduced backend exposure by approximately 88%, while introducing only a modest latency increase.

Figure 5.4 compares unauthorised traffic reaching backend services with and without gateway enforcement.



5.6 Zero Trust Service-to-Service Communication

Zero-trust principles were validated by testing internal API calls under compromised-service assumptions.

Table 5.5 Internal API Security Results

Scenario	Requests	Allowed	Blocked
Valid Service Credentials	12,400	12,280	120
Missing Service Token	6,300	0	6,300
Forged Service Identity	4,900	0	4,900
Excess Privilege Attempt	3,700	34	3,666

Even when a service was assumed compromised, zero-trust enforcement prevented lateral movement across microservices.

5.7 Rate Limiting and Abuse Resistance

Rate limiting was tested using controlled traffic bursts to simulate abuse scenarios.

Table 5.6 Rate Limiting Performance

Traffic Rate (req/sec)	Allowed (%)	Throttled (%)	Service Stability
300	100	0	Stable
700	92	8	Stable
1,200	58	42	Stable
2,000	21	79	Stable

Figure 5.5 shows increasing request throttling as traffic volume rises, preventing service disruption.

5.8 Security Incident Reduction Analysis

Post-implementation logs were compared with baseline measurements.

Table 5.7 Security Incident Comparison

Incident Type	Before Implementation	After Implementation
Unauthorized API Calls	410/week	62/week
Token Misuse Attempts	180/week	21/week
Internal Access Violations	95/week	9/week
Service Disruptions	3/month	0

5.9 Consolidated Results Summary

Security Dimension	Outcome
Authentication Reliability	High
Authorization Precision	Very High
Zero Trust Enforcement	Strong
Gateway Effectiveness	High
Performance Impact	Acceptable
Overall Security Posture	Significantly Improved

The results demonstrate that secure API design, token-based authentication, fine-grained authorisation, API gateway enforcement, and zero-trust communication can be effectively implemented and validated at realistic operational scales. The layered security architecture significantly reduced unauthorised access, abuse, and internal policy violations while maintaining stable performance.

6. DISCUSSION

The results obtained from this study provide strong empirical evidence that secure API design and robust authentication strategies can be effectively implemented in distributed microservices systems without compromising performance or scalability. By integrating security controls at multiple architectural layers—including the API gateway, identity management service, and individual microservices—the system demonstrated significant resilience against common API-centric threats while maintaining operational stability under realistic workloads. One of the most important observations from the authentication results is the high accuracy achieved in distinguishing legitimate from malicious requests. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, requests carrying valid tokens were consistently accepted, while expired, tampered, replayed, and missing tokens were overwhelmingly rejected. This confirms that token-based, stateless authentication mechanisms such as OAuth 2.0 with JWT are well-suited for microservices environments, where session-based approaches would introduce unnecessary coupling and scalability constraints. The small fraction of replay attempts that bypassed initial validation under burst conditions highlights a practical limitation of stateless tokens, reinforcing the importance of short token lifetimes and additional contextual checks in high-risk scenarios. Authentication latency analysis further supports the feasibility of the proposed approach. Figure 5.2 shows that although latency increased with request rate, the growth remained linear and predictable. Even at peak load, the 95th percentile latency stayed within acceptable thresholds for enterprise APIs. This demonstrates that security controls, when architected correctly, do not inherently degrade system responsiveness. Instead, they introduce a manageable overhead that is outweighed by the substantial reduction in security risk.

Authorisation results underscore the critical role of fine-grained access control in enforcing the principle of least privilege. The data presented in Table 5.3 and visualised in Figure 5.3 indicate that role-based and scope-based authorisation effectively prevented unauthorised access attempts, including role mismatches and scope escalation. This is particularly significant in microservices systems, where a compromised token or service identity can otherwise lead to rapid lateral movement. The near-total rejection of improper authorisation attempts confirms that embedding authorisation checks directly into service logic—rather than relying solely on perimeter controls—significantly strengthens internal security posture.

The impact of the API gateway emerged as one of the most influential factors in overall system security. As shown in Figure 5.4, enabling gateway-level enforcement dramatically reduced the volume of unauthorised and malformed requests reaching backend services. This demonstrates the gateway's effectiveness as a centralised policy enforcement point, capable of absorbing and filtering hostile traffic before it propagates into the internal service mesh. While the gateway introduced a modest increase in end-to-end latency, the trade-off proved favourable, as backend error rates and security incidents were substantially reduced.

The evaluation of zero-trust service-to-service communication revealed critical insights into internal security resilience. Results from Table 5.5 show that even when internal services were assumed to be compromised, unauthorised requests were largely blocked due to mandatory authentication and authorisation at each service boundary. This validates the zero-trust assumption that internal network location should not be equated with trust. In distributed microservices architectures—especially those deployed in dynamic container orchestration environments—this approach is essential to prevent internal breaches from escalating into system-wide failures.

Rate limiting and abuse prevention results further demonstrate the system's robustness under stress. Figure 5.5 clearly illustrates how throttling increased proportionally with traffic volume, ensuring that excessive or malicious request bursts did not overwhelm system resources. Importantly, service availability remained stable even at high request rates, indicating that rate limiting not only protects against denial-of-service conditions but also contributes to overall system reliability. This reinforces the notion that availability is a core component of security, particularly in API-driven systems.

Taken together, these findings highlight the effectiveness of a layered, defence-in-depth approach to API security in microservices architectures. No single control—whether authentication, authorisation, or gateway enforcement—was solely responsible for the observed improvements. Instead, the combination of these mechanisms created overlapping protections that significantly reduced attack success rates and operational disruptions. The results also demonstrate that secure design principles, when applied from the outset, integrate naturally with microservices paradigms rather than constraining them.

7. CONCLUSION

This project successfully demonstrated the design, implementation, and evaluation of secure API and authentication strategies tailored for distributed microservices systems. By adopting security-by-design principles and aligning them with modern cloud-native architectures, the system achieved strong protection against unauthorised access, privilege escalation,

internal trust abuse, and API abuse attacks, all while maintaining acceptable performance and scalability.

The findings confirm that token-based authentication using OAuth 2.0 and JWT provides a scalable and effective foundation for identity verification in microservices environments. When combined with fine-grained authorisation, API gateway enforcement, encrypted communication, and zero-trust service interactions, these mechanisms significantly strengthen the overall security posture of distributed systems. The results also demonstrate that realistic, medium-scale deployments can achieve enterprise-grade security outcomes without the need for hyperscale infrastructure.

A key takeaway from this study is that API security cannot be treated as a single-layer concern. Instead, it must be embedded across architectural boundaries, development practices, and runtime enforcement mechanisms. The observed reduction in security incidents and backend failures highlights the practical value of layered defences and consistent policy enforcement. Moreover, the predictable performance impact observed across tests confirms that strong security controls and system efficiency are not mutually exclusive.

Despite these successes, the study also reveals areas for future enhancement. Replay attack resistance could be further strengthened through token binding, contextual validation, or adaptive risk scoring. Advanced monitoring techniques, such as behavioural analytics and anomaly detection, could improve early detection of sophisticated attacks. Additionally, integration with service mesh technologies and automated policy management could further enhance scalability and operational consistency in larger deployments.

In conclusion, this project provides a practical and validated framework for securing APIs in distributed microservices systems. The methodologies, results, and insights presented here can serve as a reference for organisations and researchers seeking to balance agility, scalability, and security in modern cloud-native architectures. By embedding security as a foundational design principle, microservices-based systems can achieve both innovation and resilience in an increasingly hostile digital landscape.

REFERENCES

1. Rudrabhatla CK. Security design patterns in distributed microservice architecture. *arXiv Preprint*. 2020; arXiv:2008.03395.
2. Madupati B. Comprehensive approaches to API security and management in large-scale microservices environments. *SSRN Electron J*. 2023.
3. Chandramouli R. Microservices-based application systems. *NIST Spec Publ*. 2019;800-204.
4. de Almeida MG, Canedo ED. Authentication and authorisation in microservices architecture: a systematic literature review. *Appl Sci*. 2022;12(6):3023.
5. Mateus-Coelho N, Cruz-Cunha M, Ferreira LG. Security in microservices architectures. *Procedia Comput Sci*. 2021;181:1225–1236.
6. Dias WKAN, Siriwardena P. *Microservices security in action*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020.
7. Jangam SK, Karri N, Muntala PSRP. Advanced API security techniques and service management. *Int J Emerg Res Eng Technol*. 2022;3(4):63–74.
8. Barabanov A, Makrushin D. Authentication and authorisation in microservice-based systems: survey of architecture patterns. *arXiv Preprint*. 2020; arXiv:2009.02114.
9. Phanireddy S. Securing RESTful APIs in microservices architectures: a comprehensive threat model and mitigation framework. *Int J Emerg Res Eng Technol*. 2023;4(2):64–73.
10. Zdun U, Queval PJ, Simhandl G, Scandariato R, Chakravarty S, Jelic M, et al. Microservice security metrics for secure communication, identity management, and observability. *ACM Trans Softw Eng Methodol*. 2023;32(1):1–34.
11. Xu R, Jin W, Kim D. Microservice security agent based on API gateway in edge computing. *Sensors*. 2019;19(22):4905.
12. Chatterjee A, Gerdes MW, Khatiwada P, Prinz A. Applying Spring Security framework with TSD-based OAuth2 to protect microservice architecture APIs. *IEEE Access*. 2022;10:41914–41934.